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Abstract 
Around the world, investors, practitioners, regulators and policy makers seek to 
understand whether, when and why recently listed stocks, initial public offerings (IPOs) are 
delisted rather than continue trading (survive). Using data on 7,627 IPOs issued during 2000-
2008 across 32 countries, we explore the impact of the legal system on IPO survival. We find 
that IPOs in countries with better investor protections remain listed for longer. This suggests 
that better legal systems increase the net benefits companies derive from staying listed. We 
also provide evidence that better legal systems increase the effectiveness of IPO certification 
by venture capitalists, underwriters and auditors.  
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1. Introduction 
Around the world, investors, practitioners, regulators and policy makers seek to 
understand whether, when and why recently listed stocks are delisted. Yet, little is know to 
date on how delisting varies across countries and regions. This paper examines the impact of 
the legal system on delistings of initial public offerings (IPOs) across 32 countries around the 
world. Following the law and finance literature (e.g., LaPorta et al., 1997, 1998, 2006; 
Berkowitz et al., 2003) we focus on quality of the legal system as measured by the efficiency 
of the judicial system, the rule of law, the absence of corruption, the risk of expropriation and 
of contract repudiation, and the extent of shareholder rights. The law and finance literature 
(Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002) shows that a country’s legal system affects whether 
companies go public. We argue that legal systems also determine whether companies stay 
public, and hence whether their stocks remain listed. Legal systems that protect minority 
shareholders and investors increase the effectiveness of contracts, reduce the (informational 
and agency) costs of external financing and improve company performance (e.g., LaPorta 
2006; Berkowitz 2003). It is reasonable to expect that this reduces the chances of delisting 
due to poor performance. By reducing the cost of external finance, better legal systems also 
increases the benefits to company insiders of being listed net of listing costs (Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon 2002). Hence, we may expect that companies are less likely to opt for voluntary 
delisting in better legal systems. On the other hand, by facilitating creditor recourse, more 
efficient legal systems may speed up the delisting and liquidation of poorly performing 
companies.
 1
 The direction of the impact of the legal system on IPO survival is ultimately an 
empirical issue which our analysis aims to resolve. 
Either explicitly through (de-)listing rules or implicitly through established practice, 
IPO markets require the certification of issues by repeated players in financial markets with 
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 Unlike the large Financial Institutes with a ‘Too big to fail’ resolution, IPO firms face a relatively higher risk 
of bankruptcy and failure (see detailed discussions of Too big to fail resolutions in Kaufman, 2014). 
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reputational capital, including underwriters, venture capitalists (VCs), and auditors (Carter 
and Manaster 1990; Megginson and Weiss 1991). Certification helps resolve asymmetric 
information and agency problems between issuers and investors through explicit and implicit 
contracts. For control and monitoring mechanisms such as certification to be effective, 
requires a legal system that effectively enforces contracts and enables monitors to impact the 
actions of company insiders and obtain redress from them (Doidge et al., 2013). As a result, 
we may expect that certification by financial and other backers is likely to be strengthened by 
more efficient legal systems. Conversely, certification by reputable underwriters and other 
‘certifiers’ relies on intermediaries’ reputations to enforce implicit contracts rather than the 
enforcement of explicit contracts by the legal system. It may be an alternative (i.e., a 
substitute rather than a complement) to explicit contracting if it involves the use of non-
verifiable information that is privately observed by the certifying intermediary. However, the 
threat of litigation by disgruntled investors also reinforces underwriters’ incentives to avoid 
losing valuable reputation. A priori, legality may be either a substitute or a complement for 
certification, and our analysis aims to resolve this issue empirically. 
Almost all prior research on IPO survival focuses on individual countries, in most 
cases on the U.S. (e.g., Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 1999, 2000).
2
 Some studies 
examine IPOs in the UK (Espenlaub et al., 2012).
3
 Vismara et al. (2012) provide evidence on 
survival across several European countries. The quality of the legal system could have a 
significant impact on IPO survivals or failures. Previous studies on country's legal condition 
find that cross-country differences in the legal framework affect corporate governance 
(LaPorta et al. 1998; Mitton 2002) and corporate valuation (LaPorta et al. 2002). However, 
these studies do not investigate whether the survival profiles of the IPOs varies with the level 
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 Studies of IPO survival in the U.S. include Fama and French (2004), Jain and Kini (1999, 2000), Jain and 
Martin (2005), and Jain et al. (2008). 
3
 The literature on individual countries is limited but growing; see Baschieri et al. (2015) on Italy, Carpentier 
and Suret (2011) for Canada, Cressy and Farag (2014) for Hong Kong, Liu and Li (2014) for China and Gopalan 
and Gromley (2013) and Wadhwa et al. (2016) for India.  
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of legal system across countries. The survival of the IPO firms has implication for various 
stakeholders as outlined in section 2. To date not much is known whether the quality of the 
legal system have a positive/negative effect on IPO survival. Single-country (or single-
region) studies do not shed light on the impact of the legal system on IPO survival due to 
minimum variations of the legal conditions variables within a country. Our study contributes 
to the literature by investigating this impact using a sample of 7,627 IPOs issued during 
2000-2008 across 32 countries. The results of our analysis show that better legal systems help 
IPOs remain listed longer. We show that the quality of the legal system improves IPO 
survival directly (e.g., by reducing the contracting costs faced by listed firms), and also 
indirectly by increasing the positive impact on IPO survival of IPO certification by venture-
capital backers, underwriters and auditors. 
Our study also examines the impact of market conditions on IPO survival. As market 
conditions vary both across countries and over time, our cross-country analysis of market 
conditions extends single-country analyses of the impact of (time-series variations in) market 
conditions on IPO survival. Our analysis controls for a wide range of firm- and issue-specific 
variables that have been shown to impact IPO survival in single-country setting, and our 
findings are robust to a range of variations in research design. 
Our results are of interest to stock markets, regulators and policy makers worldwide 
interested in promoting stock-market listings and improving the availability of external equity 
to companies.
 4
 Our results are also of interest to investors seeking to identify stocks suitable 
for long-term investments, particularly to investors planning to commit capital outside their 
home market. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 motivates and outlines 
our research questions in the context of the conceptual framework and relevant literature. 
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 Stock market investors are also concerned with the Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) and announcement of 
large capital infusions like government bailout and private equity placement (Elyasiani et al., 2014). 
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Section 3 discusses our sample and methodology. Section 4 reports our empirical results, and 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Conceptual Framework and Literature 
2.1. Legality and IPO survival 
The ‘survival’ of IPOs, that is, the continued trading of newly listed stocks on the 
stock market, matters not just to companies, their investors and stakeholders, but more widely 
to practitioners, policy maker, regulators and even to stock markets themselves. Survival is 
typically a consequence of good firm performance. As a result, it has been proposed as a 
proxy for firm performance (e.g., Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005; Espenlaub et al., 2012) and 
complements return-based measures of post-IPO performance that are often difficult to 
quantify, suggesting that an appropriate measure of performance for IPO firms is their ability 
to survive over time (Gerakos et al., 2013). Companies, investors and policymakers are 
interested in IPO survival because as long as a stock remains listed, the issuing company can 
raise external funding from public markets. This has implications for its cost of external 
capital and real investment decisions, which in turn benefit other stakeholders including 
employees. Legal system that are more effective in reducing the information and agency costs 
of external equity increase company value (performance) and the net benefits of being listed. 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show theoretically how the legal system of a country 
affects the costs and benefits that founder-owners derive from going public. Controlling 
shareholders of IPO companies are less likely to extract private benefits from minority 
shareholders in countries with more efficient judicial systems that are characterized by the 
rule of law, stronger shareholder rights, and where there is less chance of corruption, 
expropriation and contract repudiation. By reducing the private benefits of controlling 
shareholders who can extract at the expense of minority shareholders, better legal systems 
increase the value of IPOs to investors. For a given listing cost, more effective legal systems 
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increase the net benefits founder-owners derive from listing their companies. Doidge et al. 
(2013) find empirical support for the prediction that more effective legal institutions increase 
IPO activity both in terms of numbers and proceeds of IPOs. Their study builds on the 
previous law and finance literature that demonstrates the impact of legal institutions on IPO 
activity and on economic and financial development more generally (LaPorta et al., 1997, 
1998, 2006; Berkowitz et al., 2003). LaPorta et al., (1997, 1998) find that countries with 
stronger investor (‘anti-director’) rights and tighter securities laws have higher numbers of 
IPOs per capita. Djankov et al. (2008) finds that the ratio of equity issued in IPOs (relative to 
GDP) is positively correlated with how effectively legal systems restrict insiders’ ‘self-
dealing’ transactions. The law and finance literature based on LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) also 
shows that legal institutions and rules influence other corporate decisions (capital structure, 
payout policy, VC contracting and corporate behaviour) and financial performance 
(Berkowitz, 2003; Cumming et al., 2006; Cumming et al., 2010).  
In sum, the existing literature shows that the legal system increases the likelihood that 
firms choose to go public. However, the impact of the legal system on how long companies 
stay listed remains unexplored. Following the reasoning of Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), it 
is reasonable to expect that, once listed, companies continue to derive higher net benefits of 
remaining listed in countries with more effective legal systems. The law and finance literature 
shows theoretically and empirically that better legal systems improve company performance. 
Higher company performance in turn reduces the chances of involuntary delisting and 
liquidation. An important benefit of listing is access to external equity finance. By reducing 
the information and agency costs of external equity (e.g., by reducing controlling shareholder 
consumption of private benefits), better legal systems increase the net benefits to companies 
and their owners not just from becoming listed, but from being listed. That is, better legal 
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systems increase the net benefits of keeping companies listed post-IPO. This leads us to 
predict that better legal systems reduce the incidence of voluntary delisting.  
However, in the case of underperforming companies, an efficient legal system should 
help to speed up delisting and liquidation to protect investors (including creditors’) interests. 
Extending the ‘life’ of an underperforming IPO is clearly suboptimal. During normal market 
conditions, this optimal-termination effect may affect only a small fraction of poorly 
performing stocks and the positive effect of the legal system on the contracting and 
performance of healthy stocks is likely to predominate in most circumstances. However, the 
direction of the impact of the legal system on IPO survival is ultimately an empirical issue 
which our analysis aims to resolve. 
Our paper is related to the limited literature on the impact of regulation on IPO 
delisting (Simon, 1989; Engel et al., 2007; Burhop et al., 2014; Cattaneo et al., 2015).
5
 Simon 
(1989) examines failure rates of U.S. IPOs before and after the 1933 Securities Act and finds 
a reduction in failure rates after the introduction of the Act. Engel et al. (2007) examine the 
impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on delistings from U.S. stock markets, and find evidence 
that the increased cost of compliance due to the Act reduced the benefit of being listed and 
caused some firms to delist. Burhop et al. (2014) compare the survival of IPOs on the Berlin 
and London stock markets in the decade prior to World War I. They find that London IPOs 
perform (and survive) equally well as Berlin IPOs despite less stringent regulation in London. 
Their study highlights the difficulty of comparing the impact of regulation across (a small 
number of) stock markets adopting alternative approaches to regulation. Cattaneo et al. 
(2015) examine the impact of changes in regulation on IPO survival in a single country 
(Italy) over an extensive (150-year) sample period. They find that improvements in investor 
protection over time increase IPO survival. In-depth studies of individual countries over long 
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 Unlike the studies discussed here, our empirical analysis examines the impact of cross-country variations in 
legal institutions as opposed to the impact of changes in regulation over time.  
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periods complement cross-country studies, but it is difficult to adequately control for the 
impact of contemporaneous variations in unobservable (or unobserved) variables in studies of 
single or small numbers of countries.  
To date, there is no cross-country study investigating the impact of the legal system 
on IPO survival. This study aims to fill this gap by studying the impact of the legal system on 
IPO survival using a substantial sample of IPOs that went public during 2000-2008 in one of 
32 countries across the world. We measure the quality of the legal system using the legality 
index of Berkowitz et al. (2003). Based on the work of LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998), Berkowitz 
et al. (2003) construct this index as a weighted sum of the separate LaPorta et al. (1997, 
1998) indicators on the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, absence of 
corruption, (absence of) risk of expropriation and contract repudiation.
6
 A higher legality 
index reflects a stronger legal system with better investor protection. Following previous 
studies (Cumming et al., 2007, 2010), we use the legality index to overcome the issue of high 
correlations among the separate LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) factors.  
In addition to the legality index, we also include a separate indicator of the origin of a 
country’s legal systems being Common Law as opposed to Civil Law. Common Law systems 
are of English origin, while civil law systems have French, German or Scandinavian origins. 
Previous findings show that English common law systems typically provide more rights to 
(minority) investor and better protection and enforcement of their rights (LaPorta et al., 1997, 
1998; Cumming et al., 2010). In addition to the direct (country-wide) effect of the legal 
system on IPO survival, we expect that the legal system also has an indirect effect by 
interacting with other control mechanisms within each country. Here, we focus on the 
certification of IPOs by financial backers and intermediaries involved in the issue. Single-
country studies have shown the significant impact of certification on IPO survival. Jain and 
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 See Appendix A1 for details. 
9 
 
Kini (1999) find that investment bankers’ prestige is positively related to IPO survival. Jain 
and Kini (2000) show a positive impact of pre-IPO venture-capital backing on survival, and 
confirm the positive impact of underwriter reputation. Jain and Martin (2005) investigate the 
impact of audit quality and find that it is positively related to survival. Kooli and Meknassi 
(2007) document the positive impact of underwriter reputation on survival. Cognizant of this 
certification effect, some stock markets require explicitly, while other stock markets 
encourage implicitly, that IPOs are to be certified by reputable financial firms and backers.
7
 
For instance, in the UK Alternative Investment Market, stocks are involuntarily delisted if 
they are no longer ‘supervised’ by a recognised financial firm acting as the stocks nominated 
advisor (Espenlaub et al., 2012). 
The legal system impacts the relationship between issuing firms and their pre-IPO 
financial backers, as well as between issuers and underwriters (and other intermediaries and 
advisors) involved in the IPO (Cumming et al., 2010). We expect that better investor 
protection and contracting in more effective legal systems, including the threat of legal action 
from entrenched investors, provide strong incentives to pre-IPO financial backers, 
intermediaries, advisors and agents involved in the IPO to reliably certify the quality of IPOs. 
Better contract enforcement renders contractual agreements between certifying agents (VC 
firms, underwriters and auditors) and the issuing companies (and their pre-IPO owners) more 
binding and credible to outside investors. Hence, we expect that better legal systems enhance 
the certification effect of IPO backing by venture-capital backers, underwriters and auditors. 
On the other hand, certification by reputable underwriters and other ‘certifiers’ relies 
on intermediaries’ reputation to enforce implicit contracts rather than the enforcement of 
explicit contracts by the legal system. Certifying backers and intermediaries often privately 
observe information about the issuing firm that is non-verifiable by third parties (such as 
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 See the literature on certification of IPOs through venture capital backing following Megginson and Weiss 
(1991). See the literature following Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter et al. (1998) on the impact of 
underwriter reputation on IPOs. 
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courts). Consequently, certification may be independent of, or be used as a substitute for, 
explicit contracting. A priori, the interaction effect between the legal system and certification 
may be either positive (if the two control mechanisms are complements), negative (if they are 
substitutes), or zero (if they are unrelated). Our analysis aims to resolve the issue empirically. 
Existing single-country studies do not shed light on the impact of legality on the 
relation between IPO survival and certification, i.e., the indirect effect of legality on IPO 
survival through its interaction with certification. Our study is the first to examine this 
important issue. While the direct effect of legality helps explain the variation in IPO survival 
across countries (but not within countries), a significant interaction effect between legality 
and certification explains the variation in IPO survival within a given country. 
2.2. IPO Market Conditions 
Our survival analysis also examines the impact that conditions (returns) in a country’s 
IPO market at the time of the IPO have on the survival of the IPO. Evidence from single-
country studies suggests that the initial returns of other recent issues prior to an IPO, 
reflecting the ‘hotness’ of the IPO market, impact IPO survival. Previous U.S. studies find 
that IPOs issued during hot markets to have shorter times to delisting (Demers and Joos 2007; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2010) and characterised by high initial IPO returns volatility (Lowry et 
al., 2010). Our analysis examines the impact of market activity using the hot-issue measure of 
Demers and Joos (2007), namely the country-specific average initial returns of IPOs issued 
during the three months prior to the month of the IPO. While the U.S. IPO market is 
characterised by dramatic ups and downs in IPO volumes over time, other markets (e.g., in 
Europe and Asia) have been shown to be less cyclical (Vismara et al., 2012; Espenlaub et al., 
2015). Our analysis sheds light on whether the impact of market ‘hotness’ on survival is also 
found in more stable IPO markets. While single-country studies are limited to examining how 
variations in hotness over time affect IPO survival, our cross-country analysis allows us to 
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examine the impact of both time-series as well as cross-country variations in hotness. That is, 
we examine whether IPOs issued in countries (and during period) with hot IPO markets have 
shorter (or longer) times to delisting. 
2.3. Control Variables 
Our analysis controls for the effects of a wide range of variables that have been shown 
to impact IPO survival in single-country studies. These include firm listing time 
characteristics, specifically firm size, profitability, sales, trading record (age), insider 
ownership, market-to-book ratio, leverage, cash holdings, growth of total assets and industry. 
We also control for issue characteristics including IPO initial returns and issue year. 
Existing evidence from single-country studies suggests these control variables 
significantly impact IPO survival.
8
 Hensler et al. (1997) report that IPO survival is positively 
related to firm age, size, initial IPO returns and insider ownership (suggesting a negative 
impact of public float on survival). Jain and Kini (1999) find that firm size and profitability 
(pre-IPO operating performance) are positively related to IPO survival. Kooli and Meknassi 
(2007) confirm the positive impact of firm size. Market-to-book ratio (measuring growth 
opportunities) and asset growth may be expected to increase long-term earnings and hence 
the chances of firm survival. On the other hand, Fama and French (2004) find that high-
growth stocks in the U.S. tend to have lower survival rates. Similarly, higher cash holdings 
and lower leverage may auger well for the long-term financial stability of the firm. On the 
other hand, they may also be the cause of company failure if they give rise to agency costs of 
equity due to the lack of financial discipline allowing self-interested managers to waste 
company funds. Inside ownership, i.e., the proportion of shares held by insiders is essentially 
the opposite of ‘public float’ which can be defined as (1 - insider ownership). Hence, there is 
                                                          
8
 See also the studies noted in Footnote 1 above. For conciseness, we discuss only key papers here and do not 
provide a comprehensive literature review. Some papers not discussed here include Schultz (1993), Seguin and 
Smoller (1997), Bradley et al. (2006). For a discussion of these papers and their findings, see e.g., Espenlaub et 
al. (2012).  
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potentially a trade-off between a positive impact of public float on IPO survival through 
increased stock liquidity allowing more efficient trading, and a negative agency effect 
through the dispersion of share ownership. As all past evidence is based on single-country 
studies, we have no a priori expectations on the impact of the control variables on IPO 
survival across our sample of 32 countries. Our approach of including both country- and 
firm-specific variables is consistent with previous cross-country studies (e.g. Engelen and 
Essen 2008, 2010: Boulton et al 2010; Espenlaub et al. 2015). 
3. Data and Methodology 
Our initial sample comprises of all IPOs listed between January 2000 and December 
2008 sourced from the Thomson Financials Securities Data Companies (SDC) Platinum New 
Issues database. In each country, we focus on IPOs which are listed on the main market 
where listing requirements and delisting rules are well-defined. We follow LaPorta et al. 
(1998) to identify the list of countries to be included in our sample of international IPOs. In 
line with common practice in the IPO literature, we exclude closed-end funds, right offerings, 
and unit offerings (Hasan et al., 2011). Consistent with Lin et al. (2013), we exclude IPO 
companies with offering price less than the converted, domestic-currency equivalent of $1.00. 
We also exclude cross-listed firms and ADRs as they are likely to be affected by the 
regulatory and legal requirements of more than one country. Next we collect the firm-level 
IPO-date financial data for these newly listed IPO firms from SDC Platinum New Issue 
database, Worldscope and Datastream. For an observation to be included in our final sample, 
we require both accounting data (total assets, earnings, sales, and debt level) and market data 
(first-day returns and market capitalization at the time of listing) to be available for the newly 
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listed firms. After imposing these restrictions, we are left with the final ‘full’ sample of 7,627 
IPOs across 32 countries listed during 2000 to 2008.
9
 
For our analysis of the impact of certification on IPO survival, we require data on VC 
backing, underwriter and auditor identity (and reputation). We collect these data from IPO 
prospectuses from SDC. We also collect data on two further control variables: insider 
ownership and firm age. We collect ownership from IPO prospectuses and the founding and 
incorporation dates of firms (to calculate firm age) from Worldscope and the Amadeus Osiris 
database. These additional data requirements reduce our sample to 4,755 observations across 
32 countries. To check if our reduced sample is representative of our larger, initial sample, 
we conduct a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of distributions. The 
null hypothesis of equality of the distributions cannot be rejected at conventional 
significance levels. Descriptive statistics for both samples are given in Appendix A4. 
To eliminate the impact of outliers, we trim firm-level variables, namely the initial 
return, and earnings at the upper and lower one-percent level. We winsorize size, cash 
holding, debt level, market to book, sales, and ownership concentration only at the upper one-
percent level since they have a lower bound value of zero. Since it is an international study, 
winsorization is undertaken at the country-level. 
We track each IPO firm in our sample until March 2015 to determine whether and 
when the stock is delisted from the stock market. We use stock-market lists of the listed 
stocks in each stock-market to identify whether a stock is delisted, and Datastream to identify 
when it is delisted. We define survivors as stocks that continue to trade on the stock market 
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 Following Boulton et al. (2010), we start with the 49 countries used in LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) studies, 
impose the restrictions outlined in the text, and then exclude countries with fewer than 5 IPOs. Compared to 
previous cross-country IPO studies, our resulting sample is larger than that of Boulton et al. (2010) covering 
more countries and IPO years. However, compared to Lin et al. (2013) and Doidge et al. (2013), our sample 
period is shorter and we cover fewer countries. At country-level, our sample of IPO firms is comparable to Fan 
et al. (2007) for China, Espenlaub et al. (2012, 2015) for the UK and Jain and Kini (1999, 2000) for the USA. In 
terms of our overall sample size, this is also comparable to the multi-country IPO studies of Engelen and Essen 
(2008, 2010),  
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on which they initially list, or transfer to another stock market. Non-survivors (also referred 
to as ‘failures’ or ‘deaths’) are stocks that are delisted from the stock market for any reason 
other than moving to other stock market or being taken over by another firm. If a firm is 
delisted as a result of being the target of a merger or acquisition (M&A), we classify it as a 
censored survivor unless the target firm is in financial distress at the time of the acquisition. 
In our sample of 7,627 IPOs, 754 firms delist due to M&A. Of these, 606 firms are merged or 
acquired while in financial distress and are thus classified as non-survivors;
10
 the remaining 
148 stocks are classified as censored survivors. In appendix A6, we also check whether our 
results are robust to alternative definitions of survival (specifically, treating all M&As as 
failures). 
The survival rates of IPOs are estimated non-parametrically using the Kaplan-Meier 
method based on the following expression:  
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where S(tj) is the estimated survival function in year tj measuring the probability of survival 
beyond tj conditional on the IPO being listed at least until year tj. ni is the number of the IPOs 
that are listed in a given regional subsample (or for the pooled sample) at the start of year tj, 
also known as the risk set at tj. dj is the number of the IPOs delisted during year tj.is equal 
to one if there is a failure, and zero otherwise. Alternatively, EQ. 1 can be restated as EQ. 2 to 
express the survival function in year tj as the probability of survival in year tj conditional on 
the stock being listed at least up to year tj times the survival function of the previous year tj-1. 
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 Following Gomez (2015), we assume that failed firm takeovers do not really enhance the value of the 
acquiring firm, therefore we classify the target as a non-survivor. 
15 
 
Next, we estimate a survival model known as Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) 
model to examine the determinants of the survival rates. Like the Cox (1972) model, the AFT 
model allows for the fact that companies are tracked over different time periods. For instance, 
firms listed at the beginning of the sample period are treated similarly in the estimation model 
as firms listed at the end of the sample period. Observations that dropped out of the study but 
continue to survive are treated as (right) censored. Unlike the Cox (1972) model, the AFT 
method allows the impact of the independent variables on survival time to vary over the post-
IPO period depending on the length of time since listing. That is, the AFT model allows for 
the possibility that the determinants of IPO survival may be particularly pronounced in the 
period soon after the IPO and less so in the longer term. AFT model is typically expressed in 
terms of a log-linear function with respect to time (Hensler et al., 1997; Bradburn et al., 
2003): 
 
ji0j )Ln(T   iX      (3) 
where Ln(Tj) is the natural logarithm of the survival time or time to failure, Xi denotes an 
independent variable (‘covariate’) i with coefficient βi. In the AFT model, exp∑βiXi is an 
acceleration factor. The effect of the covariates is to extend or shrink the length of survival 
time by a constant relative amount exp∑βiXi. If exp∑βiXi > 1 survival time is increased, and 
if exp∑βiXi < 1 survival time is decreased (Bradburn et al., 2003). 
We measure the marginal effect of an individual explanatory variable in the AFT 
model using its ‘time ratio’. The time ratio is calculated as the exponential of the estimated 
coefficient of a variable (Bradburn et al., 2003; Espenlaub et al., 2012). A positive coefficient 
implies a time ratio above one, indicating that an increase in the covariate increases the 
survival time. More specifically, the time ratio measures the extent to which changes in the 
independent variables speed up or slow down the occurrence of delisting. Given a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable, survival time increases by a multiple equal to the time 
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ratio. As AFT is a parametric model, it is necessary to specify the distribution of the baseline 
survival function. We use the likelihood ratio or Wald test to determine the appropriate 
distribution in case of nested models, such as comparing the Weibull against the exponential 
distribution, or the gamma against the Weibull or log-normal distributions. The AIC is the 
appropriate test to choose the best-fitting model in the case of a non-nested model between 
the log-logistic and the log-normal distribution. The AIC is defined as:  
 )(22 ckLLnAIC    (4) 
where L is the maximized value of the likelihood function, k is the number of model 
covariates and c is the number of model-specific distributional parameters. Either of the log-
normal or log-logistic models has two distributional parameters i.e. c=2. The AIC test shows 
that log-normal distribution has lower AIC value than the log-logistic model, and hence we 
select the log-normal distribution. 
For robustness check and comparative purposes, we also estimate the Cox (1972) 
Proportional Hazard model as applied by, Carpentier and Suret (2011) and Espenlaub et al. 
(2012). The Cox (1972) model is a non-parametric model that requires no assumption about 
the failure distribution. The dependent variable in the Cox (1972) model measures the risk of 
failure (by contrast, the dependent variable in the AFT model is the natural logarithm of 
survival time). In the Cox (1972) model, the marginal effect of an independent variable is 
measured by the so-called hazard ratio (calculated as the exponential coefficient from the 
Cox (1972) model). A positive (negative) coefficient implies a hazard ratio of greater (less) 
than one and indicates that an increase in the covariate increases (reduces) the failure rate. In 
comparing the results of the AFT and Cox (1972) models, we expect that a given independent 
variable with a positive sign and a time ratio above one in the AFT model will have a 
negative coefficient and a hazard ratio of less than one in the Cox (1972) model (due to the 
structural differences between the two models). 
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The main variables of interest included in our analysis of IPO survival below are the 
legality index (Berkowitz et al., 2003) and three interaction terms of legality with each one of 
three measures of certification: venture-capital backing, underwriter reputation and auditor 
reputation. As a further indicator of the legal system, we include an indicator that the 
country’s legal origin is Common Law (as opposed to Civil Law). We also include measures 
of return conditions in the IPO market (Hot Issue) and stock market (Market_return). Finally, 
we control for a broad range of firm and issue characteristics. Appendix A1 summarises the 
definitions and sources of our variables. 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the variables used in our analysis. Appendix 
A1 summarises the definitions and sources of our variables. Panel A reports numbers of 
surviving and delisted (failed) IPOs by year for the pooled sample and broken down by 
regions. The four regions are: North America (Canada and U.S.), Europe (including the 
U.K.), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and Asia-Pacific (including 
Australia and New Zealand). Appendix A2 lists the countries and summarizes country-by-
country sample size, numbers of surviving and delisted (failed) stocks alongside the county’s 
legality index. 
The figures in Panel A of Table 1 show substantial differences in IPO survival across 
regions: the percentage of surviving IPOs (of total IPOs) ranges widely with the BRICS 
countries showing the highest percentage of survivors, followed by Asia-Pacific, then North 
America, and finally Europe with the lowest percentage. Based on the whole sample period, 
only 62 percent of IPOs survive in Europe compared to 93 percent in the BRICS countries. 
The North American figure of 75 percent is similar to that of the pooled sample comprising 
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all 32 countries (78 percent). This ranking of regions in terms of the percentages of surviving 
IPOs holds for each of the IPO years. 
Due to the unequal lengths of the tracking windows (from IPO until the year of 
delisting or March 2015), the figures in Panel A of Table 1 are not comparable across IPO 
years. To resolve this issue, we next present comparable figures, specifically the non-
parametric survival rates estimated using the Kaplan-Meier method outlined in Section 3. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports survival rates over three and five years post-listing for the pooled 
sample and separately for each of the four regions. The survival rate for the pooled sample 
ranges between 87 percent (for the IPO firms listed in 2004) and 91 percent (IPOs listed in 
2003) over three-years post-listing and between 69 percent (IPOs in 2000) and 88 percent 
(IPOs in 2008) over five-years. Three-year survival rates in North-America are similar to 
those for the pooled sample ranging from 81 percent (for IPOs in 2004-5) to 79 percent (for 
IPOs in 2000). However, over the longer five-year window, North American survival rates 
are substantially lower than for the pooled sample, ranging from 62 percent (for IPOs in 
2000) to 85 percent (for IPOs in 2007). These figures correspond to failure rates of 15-38 
percent and are comparable to failure rates (ranging between 20-35 percent) reported for 
North-American IPOs in previous studies (Hensler et al., 1997; Jain and Kini, 2000; Jain et 
al., 2008). 
Survival rates in Europe are particularly low, and the drop-off in listings between 
three to five years post-IPO is particularly severe. The three-year survival rates in Europe 
range from 70 to 84 percent, while five-year rates drop to as low as 47 percent (for IPOs 
2003). However, in more recent years five-year survival rates have increased substantially to 
75-78 percent (for IPOs in 2007-8). By contrast, the BRICS and Asia-Pacific regions show 
consistently high survival rates over the medium (3-year) term and in the Asia-Pacific region 
also over the longer (5 year) term. 
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Panel C shows univariate analyses of survivors and delisted stocks. For the sample as 
a whole and for all regions except North America, the means of the legality index are 
statistically significantly higher for the survivors than for delisted stocks (at significance 
levels of 10 percent and above). The lack of significant difference in North America is due to 
the low variation in legality across both time and countries within this region (comprising the 
U.S. and Canada). For the full sample and all regions besides North America, the values of 
the binary legal-origin (Common Law) indicator show that greater proportions of stocks 
survive in Common Law countries than in Civil Law countries. (There is obviously no 
variation in the Common Law indicator across North American countries.). In sum, our 
univariate analysis suggests a positive impact of the legal system (in terms of legality and of 
common law origin) on IPO survival across all four regions and across our full, global 
sample. 
In the full sample, and separately in each region, the proportions of delisted stocks are 
significantly higher among stocks issued during hot periods in the IPO market (Hot Issue) 
than among those issued during cold markets. By contrast, conditions in the wider stock 
market (Market_return) appear to have no significant univariate relation with IPO survival. 
Two of the three measures of IPO certification: VC Backing and Underwriter 
Reputation, have statistically significantly higher means for surviving stocks than for delisted 
stocks in full sample and all four regional subsamples. By contrast, Auditor Reputation 
appears positively related with IPO survival for the full sample and in North America, but has 
an insignificant, negative association with survival in the other regions. 
The table also shows univariate analyses for the control variables used in our 
multivariate analysis. For North American IPOs all the explanatory variables are significantly 
different between surviving and delisted stocks, and most variables are on average higher for 
surviving stocks. The significance and signs of differences in means are broadly consistent 
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with previous evidence, and indicate the need to control for these variables in our 
multivariate analysis. Most of the directions of the effects of the control variables on IPO 
survival are qualitatively the same across all four regions.  
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
In sum, Table 1 demonstrates substantial regional variations in IPO survival, and the 
univariate analysis in Panel C of Table 1 indicates a number of significant determinants of 
IPO survival including our variables of interest: Legality Index, Common Law and Hot Issue 
markets. Next, we use multivariate analysis (AFT model) to examine whether the joint effects 
of these variables and the extent to which these variables explain the observed variation in 
IPO survival. The correlation matrix in Appendix A3 suggests there is no multicollinearity 
among our explanatory variables. 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
To assess the direct and indirect impact of legality on IPO survival, we estimate an 
AFT model of IPO survival. To assess the direct impact of the legal system on IPO survival 
we include the Legality Index (Berkowitz et al., 2003). To assess the indirect impact of 
legality on survival through its effect on IPO certification, we include interaction terms 
between Legality and each of three certification measures: binary indicators of venture-
capital backed IPOs, underwriter reputation and auditor reputation. To further measure the 
quality of the legal system, we include the Common Law legal-origin indicator. In addition, 
we include measures of market conditions in the IPO market (Hot Issue) and the stock market 
(Market_return). Our model controls for a broad range of firm and issue characteristics 
including issue year and industry. Appendix A1 summarises the definitions and sources of 
our variables. Table 3 reports the results of the AFT model based on the full (or ‘pooled’) 32-
country sample of 7,627 IPOs and separately for each of the four regions. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by country. 
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Consistent with our expectations, we find that the quality of the legal system 
(measured by the Legality Index and Common Law) has a significant positive impact on IPO 
survival. For the pooled sample and in each of the four regions, the coefficient of Legality is 
positive and statistically significant at 5 percent. The time ratio of 1.1712 for the pooled 32-
country sample indicates that a one-unit increase in the Legality Index increases survival 
times by 17.12 percent. A one-unit increase in the Legality Index represents an improvement 
in the legal system equivalent to the difference in Legality between the U.S. (20.85) and 
Switzerland (21.91); see Appendix A2. 
The magnitude of the impact of the legal system on IPO survival is similar (though 
somewhat smaller) when examining each of the four regions separately. In the Asia-Pacific 
region, Legality increases survival times by 13 percent, in the BRICS countries by 10 percent 
and in Europe by 8 percent. In North America, the corresponding increase is only 5 percent, 
but this is due to the small amount of variation in Legality between Canada and the U.S.: For 
either country, the average value of the Legality Index over our sample period is around 21 
(see Appendix A2.).  
Examining the impact of the legal origin of countries, we find for the pooled sample a 
positive coefficient on Common Law of 0.33 that is statistically significant at 5 percent and 
corresponds to a time ratio of 1.39. This indicates that IPOs in common law countries have 
nearly 40 percent longer survival times than those in civil law countries. Within the separate 
regions, the impact of Common Law on IPO survival is even more pronounced: IPOs in 
common law countries have survival times that are nearly twice those in civil law countries in 
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, and across BRICS countries they are three times longer. 
Examining the impact of IPO market conditions on IPO survival, we find that Hot 
Issue markets (measured by the average levels of initial returns of issues prior to a given IPO) 
have significantly negative impact on IPO survival times: IPOs that are issued in countries 
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with hot IPO markets, or during hot-issue periods, have comparatively poorer survival 
prospects. The coefficient of Hot issue markets is statistically significant at 5 percent for the 
32-country pooled sample and for each of the regional subsamples. The time ratio of 0.9746 
for the pooled sample indicates that a one-percentage point increase in the average initial 
returns of prior IPOs reduces survival time by just over 2.5 percent. The impact of Hot issue 
markets in North America is similar to that in the pooled 32-country sample. The strongest 
impact of Hot issue markets is found in the Asia-Pacific region, followed by Europe, where a 
one-percentage point increase in pre-IPO average initial returns reduces IPO survival time by 
between 4-5 percent. The smallest impact (close to no effect with a time ratio of 0.9935) 
occurs in the BRICS region. Our finding of a negative impact of Hot Issue markets is 
consistent with previous single-country results in the U.S. and U.K. (Demers and Joos, 2007; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Espenlaub et al., 2012). Our finding that this effect varies 
considerably across regions extends the insights of these single-country studies.  
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
Next, we use our reduced sample (with available data on the relevant additional VC, 
underwriter and auditor variables) to study the impact on IPO survival of IPO certification by 
underwriters, auditors and venture capitalists. The results for the Legality Index remain 
qualitatively unchanged confirming the significant positive impact of better legal systems on 
IPO survival. The Common Law indicator remains qualitatively unchanged and statistically 
significant in each of the regions (except North America) but it becomes insignificant in the 
pooled 32-country sample (with a p-value of only 0.23). The impact of Hot Issue markets 
also remains broadly comparable; in fact, its impact becomes more significant and 
pronounced than in Table 3, with a higher significance level of 1 percent for the pooled 
sample, and time ratios indicating a stronger effect particularly for North America. 
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Examining the certification measures, we find that VC backing and underwriter 
reputation impact IPO survival positively and significantly (at 5 percent) in all regions and 
for the pooled sample. This is consistent with single-country studies of the impact on IPO 
survival of underwriter and venture-capital certification (Jain and Kini 1999, 2000, Kooli and 
Meknassi 2007). Certification through reputable underwriters is similar in all four regions 
(and in the pooled sample as a whole) but plays a slightly stronger role in North America. In 
North America, IPOs that are underwritten by reputable banks have survival times that are 
almost 23 percent longer than those without reputable underwriters. The corresponding 
increase in survival times in other regions ranges from 11 to 18 percent. 
The positive impact of VC backing (observed in all regions) is particularly strong in 
North America where the survival times of VC-backed IPOs are more than twice those of 
unbacked IPOs. In the BRICS countries, the increase in survival times through VC backing is 
40 percent, while in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region survival times increase by just 11-
13 percent. Much research has focused on VC backing of IPOs in North American practice 
and research, but VC certification of IPOs seems economically less significant in other 
regions. In fact, some European findings suggest that the impact of VC backing on IPO 
survival may be small or insignificant; and in some countries and time periods, VC backing 
may even have a negative impact (Manigart et al., 2002; Vismara et al., 2012). 
We find comparatively less evidence for IPO certification by auditors. Auditor 
reputation appears to have no significant impact on IPO survival across the pooled sample in 
Table 3 (although the variable does become significant at 10 percent in Table 4 below). In 
Table 3, Auditor Reputation is statistically significant at the 10 percent level only for IPOs in 
North America and among the BRICS countries. In economic terms, the effect is small in 
North America (with reputable auditors increasing IPO survival times by just 3 percent). In 
BRICS countries, by contrast, reputable auditors increase survival times by circa 30 percent. 
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[Please insert table 3 about here] 
Based on our findings on the separate impacts on IPO survival of the legal system and 
of certification (in Tables 2 and 3), we next examine the interaction effect between the legal 
system and certification by VC backers, underwriters and auditors. Table 4 presents the 
results of AFT models that include interaction terms between ‘High legality’ and each of the 
three certification measures: VC backing, underwriter reputation and auditor reputation. We 
control for regional effects using dummies and robust standard errors are clustered by 
country.
11
 High legality is a binary indicator for countries with Legality index of above the 
median of Legality index of 19.318 (midway between the values of Hong Kong and 
Singapore). The coefficients of each of the three interaction terms between High Legality and 
the certification variables are positive and statistically significant (at 5 percent for underwriter 
and auditor reputation, and at 10 percent for VC backing). These positive signs are evidence 
that the quality of the legal system reinforces the effect of certification by VC investors and 
by reputable underwriters and auditors. All three interaction effects are economically 
significant. The time ratio on the interaction of High Legality with VC Backing is 1.1641, 
while the time ratio of the (un-interacted) VC Backing indicator is 1.1465. This indicates that 
VC-backed IPOs remain listed for periods that are nearly 15 percent longer than those of 
unbacked IPOs in countries that have legal systems of below-median quality. By contrast, in 
countries that have legal systems of above-median quality, this effect of VC certification is 
amplified and more than doubled to 31.06 (= 14.65 + 16.41) percent. 
The corresponding results for underwriter reputation show that IPOs certified by 
reputable underwriters in high-quality legal systems have survival times that are not just 5 
percent longer than uncertified IPOs, as in countries with lesser quality legal systems, but 
14.3 percent (4 .8 plus 9.5 percent) longer. This suggests that better legal institutions almost 
                                                          
11 Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we use country dummies instead of regional dummies. 
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triple the impact of underwriter certification. In the case of auditor certification, a high-
quality legal system adds an impressive 39 percentage points. Thus, certification by reputable 
auditors (Auditor Reputation) increases IPO survival times by (5 + 39) percent in countries 
with above-median legal systems. This indicates that the effectiveness of auditor certification 
of IPOs depends almost entirely on a well-functioning legal system. 
Alongside the significant interaction effects, there remains a significant, positive 
direct impact of High Legality on IPO survival (as the coefficient of the un-interacted legality 
indicator remains positive and significant at 5 percent in all models in Table 4). The time 
ratios on High Legality range from 2.02 to almost 2.6 indicating that IPOs in countries with 
legal systems of above-median quality have between two to 2.6 times longer survival times 
than IPOs in other countries. 
[Please insert table 4 about here] 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
We test the robustness of our results using a number of variations to our research 
design. To examine whether our results are sensitive to the distributional assumptions made 
in using the AFT model, we re-estimate the model in Table 4 using the non-parametric Cox 
(1972) model. We find our results are qualitatively unchanged. The results of Cox (1972) 
models estimated using the pooled sample of all 32 countries is shown in Appendix A5. In 
interpreting the results, it needs to be borne in mind that a variable with a positive impact on 
survival time (i.e., a positive coefficient in the AFT model) will have a negative impact on 
the hazard of delisting (i.e. a negative coefficient in the Cox (1972) model). 
Our approach to classifying M&A delistings in the analysis presented in Tables 1-4 
above classifies M&A delistings of poorly performing companies as failures because for 
investors such M&As are likely to involve similar wealth effects as delistings for negative 
reasons (such as liquidation). The approach in our analysis above treats M&As of well-
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performing companies as censored survivors because such delistings are likely to imply lower 
or no losses to investors and other interested parties. Alternately, it may be argued that all 
delistings are negative news, and should be classified as failures. Also, our earlier approach 
relies on a reasonably accurate measurement of the pre-M&A target company performance. 
Following previous studies we examine the robustness of our results to alternative treatments 
of M&A delistings (Howton, 2006; Espenlaub et al., 2012). Specifically, we re-classify all 
M&A delistings irrespective of firm performance as failures (non-survivors). Using this 
approach, as reported in Appendix A6, we find that all our results on the impact of legality, 
certification and IPO market conditions remain qualitatively unchanged. 
5. Conclusion 
Around the world, investors, practitioners, regulators and policy makers seek to 
understand whether, when and why recently listed stocks are delisted rather than continue 
trading. Based on the theoretical developments and empirical findings of the law and finance 
literature, we argue that legal systems that effectively protect investors’ interests, enforce 
contracts and control the information and agency costs of external financing, not only 
encourage companies to list their stocks (as shown in previous studies) but also ensure that 
IPO companies are able and willing to stay listed. 
Using data on 7,627 IPOs issued during 2000-2008 in one of 32 countries, our 
empirical findings confirm that better legal systems significantly increase the length of time 
IPO stocks remain listed (i.e., IPO survival times). Our multivariate analysis controls for a 
wide range of other determinants of IPO survival and is robust to various changes in research 
design. Our results show that a one-unit increase in the Legality Index constructed by 
Berkowitz et al. (2003), i.e., an increase in the Legality Index from its value in the U.S. 
(20.85) to that in Switzerland (21.91), increases survival times by over 17 percent. We find 
that IPOs in countries with legal systems of above-median quality (i.e., with values of the 
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Legality Index above that of Hong Kong) have between two to 2.6 times longer survival 
times than IPOs in countries with below-median legality. Our results show that IPOs in 
countries with legal institutions originating in the UK common law system have nearly 40 
percent longer survival times than those with civil law systems. 
We further examine whether better legal systems have an indirect impact on IPO 
survival by amplifying the effectiveness of IPO certification by VC investors and reputable 
underwriters and auditors. Our results show that legal systems of above-median quality 
significantly amplify the effect of IPO certification on IPO survival: doubling the certification 
effect in the case of VC certification, and tripling it in the case of underwriter certification; 
and in the case of auditor certification, we find that its effectiveness depends almost entirely 
on a well-functioning (above-median) legal system. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Panel A shows the annual distribution of IPOs that survived and failed during 
2000 through 2008 for the pooled sample of all 32 countries together, and separately for each of the four 
regions: North America, Europe, BRICS, and Asia-Pacific. Panel B shows survival rates of IPOs over three 
years and five years post listing estimated non-parametrically using the Kaplan-Meier method. Panel C shows 
the means for the surviving and delisted (failed) IPOs. The detailed definitions of the variables are in Appendix 
A1. We show t-tests to assess the significance of the differences in means between surviving and delisted IPOs. 
***,**,* indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
      
Panel A Pooled sample North America Europe BRICS Asia-Pacific 
IPO Years 
Survived Delisted Survived Delisted Survived Delisted Survived Delisted Survived Delisted 
(#) (#) (#) (#) (#) (#) (#) (#) (#) (#) 
                 
2000 662 295 93 21 191 169 109 11 269 94 
2001 394 169 42 21 79 80 42 3 231 65 
2002 394 143 44 26 49 38 59 6 242 73 
2003 464 123 46 20 27 31 71 2 320 70 
2004 766 248 106 49 110 77 125 7 425 115 
2005 766 236 110 55 121 71 105 11 430 99 
2006 945 223 127 36 200 101 223 13 395 73 
2007 1116 194 181 32 225 73 299 34 411 55 
2008 433 56 73 20 43 12 121 4 196 20 
           
Total 5940 1687 822 280 1045 652 1154 91 2919 664 
           
 
 
 
 
  
Panel B 
 
IPO Years 
Kaplan-Meier Survival rates 
Pooled sample North-America Europe BRICS Asia-Pacific 
3-Years 5-Years 3-Years 5-Years 3-Years 5-Years 3-Years 5-Years 3-Years 5-Years 
                 
2000 0.8871 0.6917 0. 7937 0.6286 0.7944 0.5306 0.9146 0.7410 0.9917 0.9083 
2001 0.9076 0.6998 0.8889 0.6667 0.8302 0.4969 0.9358 0.7804 0.9556 0.9333 
2002 0.9065 0.7364 0.8714 0.6970 0.8118 0.5765 0.9206 0.7683 0.9846 0.9077 
2003 0.9097 0.7905 0.8788 0.8158 0.7069 0.4655 0.9282 0.8205 0.9863 0.9726 
2004 0.8724 0.7577 0.8117 0.6883 0.7043 0.5914 0.9184 0.7885 0.9924 0.9470 
2005 0.8743 0.7645 0.8121 0.6667 0.7813 0.6302 0.9168 0.8129 0.9224 0.9052 
2006 0.8767 0.8091 0.8282 0.7791 0.7973 0.6645 0.9060 0.8440 0.9534 0.9449 
2007 0.9019 0.8525 0.8945 0.8532 0.8389 0.7550 0.9206 0.8820 0.9369 0.8979 
2008 0.8978 0.8855 0.8280 0.7849 0.8000 0.7818 0.9120 0.9074 0.9920 0.9680 
           
Total 0.8927 0.7764 0.8653 0.7311 0.7850 0.6103 0.9192 0.8161 0.9684 0.9317 
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Table 1 continues 
 
Panel C 
  
Pooled sample North-America Europe BRICS Asia-Pacific 
Variables Survived Delisted Diff. Survived Delisted Diff. Survived Delisted Diff. Survived Delisted Diff. Survived Delisted Diff. 
                                
Legal system                
Legality index 19.58 18.25 1.33** 21.02 20.95 0.06 20.08 19.53 0.54** 14.61 14.22 0.39** 19.16 18.61 0.54** 
Common law 0.62 0.47 0.15** 1.00 1.00 - 0.56 0.31 0.24** 0.28 0.11 0.17* 0.61 0.46 0.15* 
Market conditions                
Hot issue market 26.83 34.88 -8.05** 16.94 20.12 -3.18** 12.68 17.01 -4.33* 63.87 62.86 1.01 35.54 35.69 -0.15* 
Market_return 0.71 0.42 0.29 0.41 0.73 -0.32 0.29 0.13 0.16 1.83 2.13 -0.31 0.50 0.33 0.18 
Certification                
VC Back 0.25 0.20 0.04** 0.26 0.20 0.06** 0.34 0.30 0.05** 0.49 0.41 0.08** 0.14 0.08 0.06** 
Underwriter Rep 0.35 0.26 0.09** 0.30 0.24 0.06** 0.45 0.38 0.06** 0.47 0.40 0.07** 0.21 0.12 0.09** 
Auditor Rep 0.39 0.30 0.09** 0.38 0.33 0.05** 0.45 0.48 -0.03 0.25 0.30 -0.05 0.15 0.23 -0.08 
Firm specific, 
control variables 
               
Day one ret. 34.96 26.53 8.43** 21.56 12.68 8.89** 10.98 19.73 -8.75 64.46 55.35 9.11** 35.68 35.10 0.58 
Mkt Cap. 648.39 460.96 187.42** 841.16 451.94 389.21** 742.17 396.13 346.04** 1546.48 1175.02 371.46** 430.56 205.14 225.42** 
Total Assets 983.10 403.25 579.85** 1296.99 638.58 658.41** 1864.40 311.41 1552.99** 1705.41 675.92 1029.49** 356.82 293.10 63.72* 
EBIT to TA 6.06 2.10 3.96** 5.62 0.6 -5.00** 1.78 -2.71 4.49** 13.56 12.54 1.02* 8.34 6.40 1.94** 
Sales to TA 90.73 79.68 11.05** 54.36 45.15 9.21** 87.46 80.72 6.74* 88.89 84.61 4.28 102.93 92.54 10.39* 
MTB 3.42 3.76 -0.34* 4.14 3.25 0.88* 4.30 4.32 -0.02 3.13 3.97 -0.84** 3.02 3.41 -0.39* 
Debt to TA 22.96 25.67 -2.71* 23.31 19.55 3.76* 25.28 30.79 -5.51** 26.12 24.00 2.12 20.77 23.44 -2.68* 
Growth_TA 48.68 41.95 6.72* 61.76 50.85 10.91* 53.10 58.02 -4.93 43.30 40.41 2.89 31.82 39.72 -7.89 
Age 14.05 10.75 3.29** 10.07 8.23 1.84** 14.37 10.53 3.85** 13.88 9.48 4.41** 15.23 12.18 3.05** 
Insider own 54.71 50.41 4.30** 46.17 40.14 6.03** 53.04 48.96 4.08** 62.33 60.10 2.23* 55.53 55.81 -0.28 
Cash to TA 40.00 41.80 -1.79* 57.69 47.34 10.34** 38.42 40.27 -1.85 36.33 29.44 6.89** 40.10 41.87 -1.77** 
Foreign List 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.08** 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.06* 0.15 0.19 -0.05 
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Table 2: Results for the AFT model using the logarithm of the survival time as a dependent variable and set of IPO characteristics, quality of the legal system and market 
conditions as explanatory and control variables. IPO firms are classified as survivors if they continue to trade on the stock market or move to a different market. M&A 
delistings of well-performing companies are classified as censored survivors if they rank above median based on all of the following three company performance measures in 
the year prior to the M&A delisting: cash to total assets, total liability to total asset and operating income to total asset. The results are reported for the pooled sample of all 32 
countries together, and separately for each of the four regions: North America, Europe, BRICS, and Asia-Pacific. We control for year and industry fixed effects, and robust 
standard errors are clustered by country. For the detailed definition and construction of the variables, please refer to the Appendix A1. We report the coefficients and the time 
ratios (TR). ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Pooled sample North-America Europe BRICS Asia-Pacific 
Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. 
             
Legal system            
Legality Index (+/-) 0.1580** 1.1712 0.0459** 1.0470 0.0722** 1.0749 0.0946** 1.0992 0.11758** 1.1248 
Common Law (+/-) 0.3306** 1.3918 — — 0.6111** 1.8425 1.0860** 2.9624 0.6518*** 1.9190 
            
Market conditions            
Hot issue markets (-) -0.0257** 0.9746 -0.0301** 0.9703 -0.0409** 0.9599 -0.0065** 0.9935 -0.0498** 0.9514 
Market_returns (+) 0.0059 1.0059 0.0517 1.0531 0.0082 1.0082 0.0143 1.0144 0.0248* 1.0251 
            
Firm specific control variables          
Day one ret. (+/-) 0.0016** 1.0016 0.0031* 1.0031 0.0010 1.0010 0.0033** 1.0033 0.0013 1.0013 
Ln_Mkt Cap. (+) 0.0277** 1.0281 0.1390** 1.1491 0.0868*** 1.0907 0.0253* 1.0256 0.0731** 1.0758 
EBIT to TA (+) 0.0012** 1.0012 0.0091** 1.0091 0.0027** 1.0027 0.0066** 1.0066 0.0040** 1.0040 
Sales to TA (+) 0.0008 1.0008 0.0009 1.0009 0.0002 1.0002 0.0012 1.0012 0.0006 1.0006 
MTB (+/-) -0.0081* 0.9919 -0.0201 0.9801 0.0031 1.0031 -0.0469 0.9542 -0.0002 0.9998 
Debt to TA (-) -0.0007** 0.9993 -0.0008 0.9992 -0.0002 0.9998 -0.0008 0.9992 -0.0037** 0.9963 
Growth_TA (+/-) 0.0005 1.0005 0.0003 1.0003 0.0003 1.0003 0.0009 1.0009 0.0006 1.0006 
Constant  6.7029***  1.4640***  4.3259**  6.1548***  6.0355**  
       
Year   Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry   Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R-square  0.155 0.112 0.122 0.091 0.141 
No of Obs.  7627 1102 1697 1245 3583 
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Table 3: Results of the AFT model using the subsample of IPO firms with data available for the certification 
measures (VC backing, underwriter and auditor reputation). IPO firms are classified as survivors if they 
continue to trade on stock market or moved to a different market. M&A delistings of well-performing 
companies are classified as censored survivors if they rank above median based on all of the following three 
company performance measures in the year prior to the M&A delisting: cash to total assets, total liability to total 
asset and operating income to total asset. The results are reported for all the pooled sample (of all 32 countries 
together), and separately for North America, Europe, BRICS and Asia-Pacific. We control for year and industry 
fixed effects, and robust standard errors are clustered by country. For the detailed definition and construction of 
the variables, please refer to Appendix A1. We report the coefficients and the time ratios (TR). ***,**,* indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Pooled sample North-America Europe BRICS Asia-Pacific 
Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. 
            
Legal system            
Legality Index (+/-) 0.1866** 1.2051 0.0476** 1.0488 0.0854** 1.0892 0.1065** 1.1124 0.2768** 1.3189 
Common Law (+/-) 0.1568 1.1698 — — 0.6083** 1.8373 0.6100** 1.8404 0.5174** 1.6777 
            
Market condition            
Hot issue Markets (-) -0.0462*** 0.9549 -0.1260** 0.8816 -0.0318** 0.9687 -0.0148* 0.9853 -0.0531** 0.9483 
Market_returns (+) 0.0165 1.0166 0.0263 1.0266 0.0212 1.0214 0.0168 1.0169 0.0485 1.0497 
            
Certification            
VC Back (+) 0.0378** 1.0385 0.7078** 2.0295 0.1254** 1.1336 0.3396** 1.4044 0.1082** 1.1143 
Underwriter Rep  (+) 0.1482** 1.1597 0.2030** 1.2251 0.1676** 1.1825 0.1191** 1.1265 0.1052** 1.1109 
Auditor Rep  (+) 0.0174 1.0176 0.0265* 1.0269 0.0333 1.0339 0.2464* 1.2794 0.0598 1.0616 
          
Firm specific control variables          
Day one ret. (+/-) 0.0017*** 1.0017 0.0048** 1.0048 0.0004 1.0004 0.0010 1.0010 0.0008* 1.0008 
Ln_Mkt Cap. (+) 0.0895*** 1.0936 0.0378** 1.0385 0.1273** 1.1358 0.0384** 1.0391 0.0253** 1.0256 
EBIT to TA (+) 0.0012** 1.0012 0.0032** 1.0032 0.0020** 1.0020 0.0179** 1.0181 0.0011** 1.0011 
Sales to TA (+) 0.0002 1.0002 0.0006 1.0006 0.0002 1.0002 0.0003 1.0003 0.0007 1.0007 
MTB (+/-) -0.0038 0.9962 0.0126 1.0127 0.0098 1.0098 -0.0685** 0.9338 0.0040 1.0040 
Debt to TA  (-) -0.0001 0.9999 -0.0066* 0.9934 0.0011 1.0011 -0.0034 0.9966 -0.0039* 0.9961 
Growth_TA  (+/-) 0.0006 1.0006 -0.0005 0.9995 0.0004 1.0004 0.0003 1.0003 0.0001 1.0001 
Ln_Age (+) 0.2280*** 1.2561 0.1779*** 1.1947 0.0739** 1.0767 0.4111** 1.5085 0.1551** 1.1678 
Insider own (+/-) 0.0016* 1.0016 0.0008* 1.0008 0.0026* 1.0026 0.0106** 1.0107 0.0027* 1.0027 
Cash to TA (+/-) 0.0043** 1.0043 0.0077** 1.0077 0.0024* 1.0024 0.0004 1.0004 0.0018 1.0018 
Foreign List  (+) 0.0444 1.0454 1.1985** 3.3151 0.0256 1.0259 1.5124* 4.5376 0.0903 1.0945 
Constant  6.1687**  2.6561**  4.0593**  7.8086**  6.0481**  
       
Year   Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry   Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R-square  0.141 0.117 0.121 0.098 0.131 
No of Obs.  4755 711 1016 784 2244 
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Table 4: Results of AFT model using the interaction terms between legality and the certification measures (VC 
backing, and underwriter and auditor reputation). IPO firms are classified as survivors if they continue to trade 
on the stock market or move to a different market. M&A delistings of well-performing companies are classified 
as censored survivors if they rank above median based on all of the following three company performance 
measures in the year prior to the M&A delisting: cash to total assets, total liability to total asset and operating 
income to total asset. The results are reported for all 32 countries together. We control for year, industry and 
regional dummies, and robust standard errors are clustered by country. For the detailed definition and 
construction of the variables, please refer to Appendix A1. We report the coefficients and the time ratios (TR). 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Pooled sample Pooled sample Pooled sample 
Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. 
        
Legal system        
High legality x VC back (+/-) 0.1520* 1.1641     
High legality x Underwriter Rep (+/-)   0.0911** 1.0953   
High legality x Audit Rep (+/-)     0.3292** 1.3899 
High Legality (+/-) 0.7048** 2.0234 0.7317** 2.0786 0.9413** 2.5632 
Common Law  (+/-) 0.1898 1.2090 0.1820 1.1996 0.1941 1.2142 
        
Market condition        
Hot issue Market (-) -0.0355** 0.9652 -0.0351** 0.9655 -0.0354** 0.9653 
Market_returns (+) 0.0229 1.0231 0.0226 1.0229 0.0235 1.0238 
        
Certification        
VC Back (+) 0.1367** 1.1465 0.0396** 1.0404 0.0411** 1.0419 
Underwriter Rep (+) 0.0134** 1.0135 0.0467** 1.0478 0.0082** 1.0083 
Auditor Rep (+) 0.1610* 1.1747 0.1609* 1.1746 0.0491* 1.0504 
        
Firm-specific        
Day one ret. (+/-) 0.0015** 1.0015 0.0015** 1.0015 0.0015** 1.0015 
Ln_Mkt Cap. (+) 0.1093** 1.1155 0.1103** 1.1166 0.1064** 1.1123 
EBIT to TA (+) 0.0005** 1.0005 0.0005** 1.0005 0.0004** 1.0004 
Sales to TA (+) 0.0008 1.0008 0.0007 1.0007 0.0005 1.0005 
MTB (+/-) -0.0015 0.9985 -0.0015 0.9985 -0.0012 0.9988 
Debt to TA (-) -0.0006 0.9994 -0.0007 0.9993 -0.0003 0.9997 
Growth_TA (+/-) 0.0003 1.0003 0.0003 1.0003 0.0003 1.0003 
Ln_Age (+) 0.2331** 1.2625 0.2331** 1.2625 0.2315** 1.2605 
Insider own (+/-) 0.0039* 1.0039 0.0035* 1.0035 0.0037* 1.0037 
Cash to TA (+/-) 0.0039** 1.0039 0.0038** 1.0038 0.0039** 1.0039 
Foreign List (+) 0.0168 1.0169 0.0186 1.0188 0.0119 1.0119 
Constant  2.8811**  2.9020**  3.0429**  
     
Year  Included Included Included 
Industry  Included Included Included 
Region  Included Included Included 
Pseudo R-square  0.154 0.151 0.138 
No of Obs.  4755 4755 4755 
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Appendix A1: Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variables / acronym  Definition 
  
  
Legality Index The index of the quality of the legal system in the country of origin of the IPO firm (Berkowitz 
et al., 2003) in the calendar year of listing; the index is constructed as the weighted average of 
separate indicators, used in LaPorta et al. (1998), of the efficiency of the company’s judicial 
system, the rule of law, corruption, the risk of expropriation, and the risk of contract repudiation. 
The Legality index = 0.381*(Efficiency of Judiciary) + 0.5778*(Rule of Law) + 
0.5031*(Corruption) + 0.3468*(Risk of Expropriation) + 0.3842*(Risk of Contract 
Repudiation). 
High legality A dummy variable equal to one if the legality index is above median and zero otherwise. 
Common Law A dummy variable, which indicates whether a company originates from a common law country; 
Common = 1, otherwise zero. Source: LaPorta et al. (1998). 
Hot issue market Country-specific average initial returns of IPOs issued during the three months prior to the 
month of the IPO (similar to a measure used by Demers and Joos, 2007).  
Market_return Country-specific monthly average returns of the benchmark index during the three months prior 
to the month of the IPO issuance. Source: Datastream 
Venture Capital Backing – VC Back A dummy variable, which indicates whether the IPO was backed by the Venture Capital and / or 
Private Equity, VC Back = 1; otherwise zero. Source: SDC Platinum Database 
Underwriter Reputation – Underwriter 
Rep 
A dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the IPO Underwriter is in the top quartile of the 
underwriter ranking. Ranking is assigned based on the number of deals and total proceeds by an 
investment bank in a specific year and market. 
Auditor – Auditor Rep A dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the auditor of the IPO firm is one of the Big 4 
Accounting and Auditing Firms, and zero otherwise. 
Initial return – Day one ret. Logarithmic return of first – day secondary market closing price divided by the offer price, in 
percentage. Source: SDC Platinum Database, Datastream / Worldscope. 
Market capitalization – Mkt. Cap Listing-time market capitalization i.e. the offer size of the IPO firm, in million US$. In AFT 
model we use the natural logarithm of the market cap. Source: Datastream / Worldscope. 
Total assets – TA Listing-time total assets of the firm, in million US$. Source: Datastream / Worldscope. 
Earnings ratio – EBIT to TA Earnings before interest but after tax divided by total assets for the financial year when the IPO 
firm is listed, in percentage. Source: Datastream / Worldscope. 
Sales ratio – Sales to TA Total sales divided by total assets for the financial year when the IPO firm is listed, in 
percentage. Source: Datastream / Worldscope. 
Market to book – MTB Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the time of the IPO firm listing. 
Source: SDC Platinum Database, Datastream / Worldscope. 
Leverage ratio – Debt to TA The sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the total assets for the financial year when 
the IPO firm is listed, in percentage. Source: Datastream / Worldscope. 
Total assets growth – Growth_TA The relative change / growth in total assets for the financial year when the IPO firm is listed 
compared to financial year prior listing, in percentage. Source: Datastream / Worldscope. 
Firm age - Age Age of the firm, in years, at the time of listing since it was founded / incorporated. In AFT 
model we use the natural logarithm of age. Source: SDC Platinum Database / Worldscope / 
Amadeus Osiris. 
Insider ownership – Insider own The number of shares held by the insiders (shareholders who hold 5% or more of the 
outstanding shares, such as managers, officers, directors, immediate families, other firms or 
individuals) as a percentage of the total number of outstanding common shares, at the time of 
listing of the IPO firm, which is (1 – public float). Source: SDC Platinum Database / 
Worldscope. 
Cash holding – Cash to TA The sum of cash and short-term investments divided by the total assets for the financial year 
when the IPO firm is listed, in percentage. Source: Datastream / Worldscope. 
Foreign Listing – Foreign List A dummy variable, which indicates whether the IPO firm was also cross-listed in foreign 
market, or had an ADR at the time of listing, Foreign List = 1; otherwise zero. Source: SDC 
Platinum Database, Worldscope 
North-America Canada, The U.S. 
Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, The U.K., 
BRICS Brazil, China, India, Russian Federation, South Africa 
Asia-Pacific Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand 
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Appendix A2: Descriptive statistics by country. For each of the 32 sample countries, the table reports 
descriptive statistics by sample country for selected variables: the numbers of IPOs, surviving and delisted 
(failed) IPOs (tracked from Jan. 2000 to March 2015); origin of legal system (= 1 if common law, zero for civil 
law); average value of legality index during our sample period (2000-2008). 
 
Countries N 
Survive 
# 
Delisted 
# 
Common 
law 
Legality 
index 
          
Australia  697 499 198 1 20.436 
Austria  26 15 11 0 20.758 
Belgium  40 28 12 0 20.817 
Brazil  98 82 16 0 14.085 
Canada  470 303 167 1 21.129 
China  769 711 58 0 14.698 
Denmark  27 18 9 0 21.549 
Finland  13 11 2 0 21.488 
France  269 198 71 0 19.667 
Germany  198 135 63 0 20.442 
Greece  94 69 25 0 14.908 
Hong Kong  240 197 43 1 19.110 
India  321 313 8 1 12.797 
Italy  101 73 28 0 17.235 
Japan  1006 805 201 0 20.362 
Korea South 356 317 39 0 14.226 
Malaysia  344 279 65 1 16.671 
Netherlands  33 17 16 0 21.672 
New Zealand  38 20 18 1 14.507 
Norway  49 30 19 0 21.776 
Portugal  8 7 1 0 17.203 
Russia  45 38 7 0 17.130 
Singapore  255 204 51 1 19.526 
South Africa  12 10 2 1 14.507 
Spain  26 16 10 0 17.130 
Sweden  50 36 14 0 21.560 
Switzerland  42 33 9 0 21.914 
Taiwan  477 455 22 0 17.623 
Thailand  170 143 22 1 17.623 
Turkey  33 33 5 0 11.617 
United Kingdom  688 326 362 1 20.407 
United States  632 519 113 1 20.849 
        
Total 7627 5940 1687 0.507 18.539 
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Appendix A3: Correlation matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
                     
1 Survival 1                   
2 Day one ret. 0.0509 1                  
3 Ln_Mkt Cap. 0.0526 0.044 1                 
4 EBIT to TA 0.0836 0.0985 0.1671 1                
5 Sales to TA 0.053 0.0672 0.0111 0.397 1               
6 MTB -0.0313 0.1399 0.1804 -0.0143 0.0963 1              
7 Debt to TA -0.0225 -0.0186 0.0694 -0.0746 0.0361 0.0265 1             
8 Growth_TA -0.0343 0.0191 0.0124 -0.078 -0.0459 0.0596 0.0822 1            
9 Ln_Age 0.158 0.0087 0.161 0.2083 0.3176 -0.0058 0.0621 -0.1517 1           
10 Insider own 0.0769 0.0107 0.0891 0.1568 0.1562 0.0748 0.0011 -0.0222 0.1319 1          
11 Cash to TA -0.0221 -0.0082 -0.1358 -0.3277 -0.4148 0.0304 -0.1561 0.1223 -0.3306 -0.1249 1         
12 VC Back 0.0176 0.0426 -0.0247 -0.0418 -0.1007 -0.0114 -0.0287 0.0386 -0.1143 -0.0205 0.1048 1        
13 Underwriter Rep  0.083 0.008 -0.017 -0.087 -0.1072 0.0324 -0.0212 0.0575 -0.1461 -0.0753 0.1044 0.2365 1       
14 Auditor Rep  0.0794 -0.002 -0.0047 0.0817 0.0924 0.0205 -0.0222 0.0312 -0.152 -0.0442 0.0914 0.1801 0.1907 1      
15 Foreign List  0.0106 -0.0738 0.2065 0.0349 -0.057 -0.0182 -0.0203 0.0076 0.0175 0.1277 0.0046 0.0288 -0.0156 0.016 1     
16 Legality Index 0.2058 0.1281 0.1244 0.2708 0.0661 0.1084 -0.0026 0.0547 -0.1579 0.1714 0.2809 0.0428 0.0438 0.0476 0.08 1    
17 Common Law 0.1251 -0.1583 -0.2065 -0.2051 -0.2084 0.0034 -0.0096 0.0687 -0.3293 -0.12 0.1904 -0.1182 0.0271 0.0413 0.0301 0.2776 1   
18 Hot Issue -0.0773 -0.6358 -0.0856 -0.1071 -0.0738 -0.0465 0.0047 -0.0256 0.0597 0.0614 -0.0199 0.0689 0.0279 -0.009 -0.0736 -0.1985 -0.2454 1  
19 Market_returns 0.0322 0.1016 0.0986 0.0138 -0.0138 0.0143 0.0058 0.018 0.0197 0.0124 -0.0225 -0.0011 0.0249 -0.0175 0.0079 -0.1266 0.0184 0.1625 1 
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Appendix A4: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis across 32 countries for IPOs listed 
between 2000 and 2008. Panel A shows the results for the larger sample of 7,627 observations, while Panel B 
shows the results of the smaller sample with 4,755 observations (reduced due to missing observations for several 
variables). Non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution do not reject the null hypothesis 
that the pooled sample (panel A) and reduced sample (panel B) are statistically different. 
 
Panel A: Pooled sample   Mean Std. dev. 5% Q1 Median Q3 95% 
Legal system         
Legality index  18.54 2.68 14.09 16.67 20.36 20.44 21.13 
Common law (Dummy)  0.51 0.50 - - 1.00 - - 
Market conditions         
Hot issue market (%)  29.10 44.36 -12.64 6.28 19.79 46.33 127.14 
Market_return (%)  0.65 3.73 -5.72 -1.10 0.72 2.55 6.44 
Firm specific control variables       
Sales to TA (%)  88.29 86.52 0.00 16.69 70.60 127.89 262.57 
MTB  3.50 4.54 0.64 1.26 2.19 3.85 10.39 
Debt to TA (%)  23.55 50.02 0.00 0.26 14.63 35.59 67.51 
Growth_TA (%)  43.44 81.44 -24.62 5.77 24.60 56.91 176.11 
Day one ret. (%)  33.10 68.75 -26.04 0.22 12.20 41.76 165.60 
Mkt Cap. (US$ Mil.)  606.96 4449.34 5.14 23.57 71.52 259.06 1857.17 
Total Assets (US$ Mil.)  854.93 12555.52 0.84 9.31 30.88 102.48 1147.03 
EBIT to TA (%)  5.18 19.65 -40.00 -0.28 6.63 13.53 33.09 
No of Obs. 7,627        
         
Panel B: reduced sample  Mean Std. dev. 5% Q1 Median Q3 95% 
Legal system         
Legality index  18.78 2.63 14.09 16.67 20.41 20.44 21.13 
Common law (Dummy)  0.60 0.49 - - 1.00 - - 
Market conditions         
Hot issue market (%)  29.83 42.98 -16.86 5.95 18.17 42.15 111.46 
Market_return (%)  0.77 3.48 -4.69 -0.90 0.62 2.34 5.96 
Certification         
VC Back (Dummy)  0.33 0.47 - - 0.00 - - 
Underwriter Rep (Dummy)  0.37 0.48 - - 0.00 - - 
Auditor Rep (Dummy)  0.42 0.49 - - 0.00 - - 
Firm specific control variables       
Day one ret. (%)  34.82 65.98 -24.24 0.26 11.95 41.29 159.41 
Mkt Cap. (US$ Mil.)  599.15 4381.06 5.12 23.13 69.61 258.21 1821.62 
Total Assets (US$ Mil.)  848.12 12552.38 0.76 8.16 29.11 101.37 1127.02 
EBIT to TA (%)  4.95 20.64 -40.00 -0.25 6.31 13.31 32.22 
Sales to TA (%)  87.87 85.81 0.00 15.04 69.89 126.69 261.75 
MTB  4.04 4.68 0.71 1.33 2.17 4.08 11.69 
Debt to TA (%)  23.25 49.01 0.00 0.21 13.03 33.78 65.98 
Growth_TA (%)  45.99 83.51 -28.54 5.82 26.23 61.28 180.51 
Age (Years)  12.09 17.54 0.00 1.00 6.00 14.00 50.20 
Insider own (%)  53.74 24.05 7.78 36.31 58.29 71.43 88.75 
Cash to TA (%)  43.70 33.67 1.22 13.14 35.66 74.14 99.07 
Foreign List (Dummy)  0.24 0.43 - - 0.00 - - 
No of Obs. 4,755        
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Appendix A5: Results of a Cox (1972) model using the smaller sample of IPO firms with available data on age, insider ownership (i.e., 1 - public float), cash to total asset, 
VC backing, underwriter and auditor reputation. IPO firms are classified as censored if they continue to trade on stock market or moved to a different market. M&A 
delistings of well-performing companies are classified as censored if they rank above median based on all of the following three company performance measures in the year 
prior to the M&A delisting: cash to total assets, total liability to total asset and operating income to total asset. The results are reported for the pooled sample, followed by 
North America, Europe, BRICS and Asia-Pacific. We control for year and industry fixed effects, and robust standard errors are clustered by country. For the detailed 
definition and construction of the variables, please refer to Appendix A1. We report coefficients and hazard ratios (HR). ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Pooled sample North-America Europe BRICS Asia-Pacific 
Coeff. HR. Coeff. HR. Coeff. HR. Coeff. HR. Coeff. HR. 
Legal system            
Legality index (+/-) -0.2192** 0.8032 -0.0421** 0.9588 -0.1000** 0.9048 -0.3832** 0.6817 -0.1513** 0.8596 
Common Law (+/-) -0.1874 0.8291 — — -0.6434** 0.5255 -0.9966** 0.3691 -0.5923** 0.5531 
Market conditions            
Hot issue (+) 0.0542** 1.0557 0.1184** 1.1257 0.0385** 1.0393 0.0306** 1.0311 0.0623** 1.0643 
Market_returns (-) -0.0238 0.9765 0.0232 1.0235 -0.0333 0.9672 0.0111 1.0112 -0.0618 0.9401 
Certification            
VC Back (-) -0.0416** 0.9593 -0.6925** 0.5003 -0.1715** 0.8424 -0.0733** 0.9293 -0.1033** 0.9019 
Underwriter Rep (-) -0.0135** 0.9866 -0.0023** 0.9977 -0.1928** 0.8246 -0.0390** 0.9618 -0.1553** 0.8562 
Auditor Rep (-) -0.1537 0.8575 -0.1199* 0.8870 -0.0852 0.9183 -0.5055* 0.6032 -0.0504 0.9508 
Firm specific control variables           
Day one ret. (-/+) -0.0018*** 0.9982 -0.0043** 0.9957 -0.0010 0.9990 -0.0012 0.9988 -0.0007* 0.9993 
Ln_Mkt Cap. (-) -0.1210*** 0.8860 -0.0032** 0.9968 -0.1603** 0.8519 -0.0458** 0.9552 -0.0076** 0.9924 
EBIT to TA (-) -0.0011** 0.9989 0.0010** 1.0010 -0.0014** 0.9986 0.0197** 1.0199 -0.0003** 0.9997 
Sales to TA (-) -0.0003 0.9997 -0.0007 0.9993 0.0001 1.0001 -0.0001 0.9999 -0.0012 0.9988 
MTB (+/-) 0.0046 1.0046 -0.0069 0.9931 -0.0098 0.9902 0.0935** 1.0980 -0.0052 0.9948 
Debt to TA (+) 0.0001 1.0001 -0.0066* 0.9934 0.0011 1.0011 0.0054 1.0054 0.0034* 1.0034 
Growth_TA (+/-) 0.0005 1.0005 0.0004 1.0004 0.0003 1.0003 -0.0009 0.9991 -0.0002 0.9998 
Ln_Age (-) -0.2595** 0.7714 -0.1921** 0.8252 -0.0911** 0.9129 -0.4963** 0.6088 -0.1869** 0.8295 
Insider own (+/-) -0.0017** 0.9983 0.0014** 1.0014 -0.0028** 0.9972 -0.0110** 0.9891 -0.0031** 0.9969 
Cash to TA (+/-) -0.0049** 0.9951 -0.0083** 0.9917 -0.0034** 0.9966 -0.0040 0.9960 -0.0025 0.9975 
Foreign List (-) -0.0347 0.9659 -1.0929** 0.3352 -0.0589 0.9428 -1.5444** 0.2134 -0.0984 0.9063 
Year  Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry  Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R-square  0.111 0.105 0.117 0.088 0.120 
No of Obs.  4755 711 1016 784 2244 
42 
 
Appendix A6: Results of AFT model using sample of IPOs with all M&A classified as failures. IPO firms are classified as survivors if they continue to trade on the stock 
market or are moved to a different market. Model uses reduced sample with available data on age, insider ownership (i.e., 1 - public float), cash to total asset, VC backing, 
underwriter and auditor reputation. The results are reported for all 32 countries together, and separately for North America, Europe, BRICS, and Asia-Pacific. We control for 
year and industry fixed effects, and robust standard errors are clustered by country. For the detailed definition and construction of the variables, please refer to Appendix A1. 
We report coefficients and time ratios (TR). ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Pooled sample North-America Europe BRICS Asia-Pacific 
Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. Coeff. TR. 
Legal system            
Legality index (+/-) 0.1866** 1.2051 0.0648** 1.0669 0.0595** 1.0613 0.0214** 1.0216 0.2820** 1.3258 
Common Law (+/-) 0.1568 1.1698 — — 1.0036** 2.7281 1.6019** 4.9625 0.5288** 1.6969 
Market conditions            
Hot issue (-) -0.0462** 0.9549 -0.1466** 0.8636 -0.0499** 0.9513 -0.0888* 0.9150 -0.0505** 0.9508 
Market_returns (+) 0.0165 1.0166 0.0208 1.0210 0.0324 1.0329 -0.0369 0.9638 0.0499 1.0512 
Certification            
VC Back (+) 0.0378** 1.0385 0.5562** 1.7440 0.1764** 1.1929 0.1486** 1.1602 0.0198** 1.0200 
Underwriter Rep (+) 0.0174** 1.0176 0.0146** 1.0147 0.1954** 1.2158 0.0419** 1.0428 0.1203** 1.1278 
Auditor Rep (+) 0.1482 1.1597 0.1227* 1.1305 0.1010 1.1063 0.2814* 1.3250 0.1028 1.1083 
Firm-specific control variables           
Day one ret. (+/-) 0.0016*** 1.0016 0.0042* 1.0042 0.0004 1.0004 0.0034 1.0034 0.0011 1.0011 
Ln_Mkt Cap. (+) 0.0895*** 1.0936 0.0272** 1.0276 0.0336** 1.0342 0.2818** 1.3255 0.0237** 1.0240 
EBIT to TA (+) 0.0012** 1.0012 0.0014** 1.0014 0.0032** 1.0032 0.0145** 1.0146 0.0027** 1.0027 
Sales to TA (+) 0.0002 1.0002 0.0012 1.0012 0.0014 1.0014 0.0014 1.0014 0.0009 1.0009 
MTB (+/-) -0.0038 0.9962 0.0142 1.0143 0.0087 1.0087 -0.0595** 0.9422 0.0048 1.0048 
Debt to TA (-) -0.0001 0.9999 -0.0044 0.9956 0.0015 1.0015 -0.0069 0.9931 -0.0023 0.9977 
Growth_TA (+/-) 0.0006 1.0006 0.0016 1.0016 0.0009 1.0009 0.0024 1.0024 -0.0003 0.9997 
Ln_Age (+) 0.2280*** 1.2561 0.0389** 1.0397 0.0429** 1.0438 0.2437** 1.2760 0.0742** 1.0770 
Insider own (+/-) 0.0016* 1.0016 0.0105* 1.0106 0.0032* 1.0032 0.0239** 1.0242 0.0001 1.0001 
Cash to TA (+/-) 0.0043** 1.0043 0.0101** 1.0102 0.0020* 1.0020 0.0080 1.0080 0.0002 1.0002 
Foreign List (+) 0.0444 1.0454 0.5192* 1.6807 1.0453 2.8443 0.8854* 2.4240 1.1542 3.1715 
Constant  6.1687**  4.3967**  6.0024**  5.1526**  4.6827**  
Year  Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry  Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R-square  0.139 0.109 0.119 0.088 0.122 
No of Obs.  4755 711 1016 784 2244 
